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Amber · Young, with a conflict of interest Purpose-driven private equity; aerospace supplier · ES since 2023 Indaero: 47 employees, EUR 3.0m (2024); Krisos: 3 companies

Krisos / Indaero

A fund bought a small aerospace supplier, removed the bosses and doubled the profit - and the fund's owners are the ones reporting it

Krisos is Corporate Rebels' own investment vehicle: it buys struggling small companies only if at least 80% of the staff vote for it, and transforms them on the Basque NER model into self-organised, profit-sharing firms. Indaero in Seville, bought in July 2023, is the first case: seven self-organised teams, salaries up 27%, a quarter of net profit shared equally. The facts are externally confirmed; the outcome numbers all come from Krisos.

Last reviewed: 16 September 2026

Why this status

Takeover, 100% control since 2026, investment, new hall, certification and the 87% staff vote are confirmed by Spanish press and registers. Every performance figure comes from the fund's own founders, who also run the most-read blog in the field. Cite it as a documented transformation, not as proof.

What makes it a Beta case

  • Krisos (founded 2021 by Pim de Morree, Joost Minnaar, Dunia Reverter, Xavier Costa and Jabi Salcedo, president of the NER Group): targets companies of 40-150 people, EUR 5-10m revenue, in trouble; buys only with at least 80% staff approval; since November 2024 rebuilding as "Krisos 2.0", foundation-owned and evergreen, no forced exits.
  • NER (Nuevo Estilo de Relaciones, Koldo Saratxaga, from Irizar 1991-2005): no bosses, self-organised teams with elected representatives, open books, three pay grades, profit shared equally, decisions by consent.
  • Indaero (Alcalá de Guadaíra, Airbus and space supplier): five hierarchy levels replaced by seven self-organised teams whose elected representatives form the decision forum for hiring, investment, sales and strategy; open books with a simplified parallel accounting; salaries co-created and transparent; former managers in specialist roles.
  • Money: 25% of net profit distributed equally to everyone (30% was planned), salaries up 27% in 2024, holidays from 21 to 30 days.

What is documented

  • Externally confirmed: takeover on 12 July 2023 with an 87% staff vote (75%, 100% since May 2026 after buying the co-founder's 25%); EUR 1.3m invested since 2023 plus EUR 0.5m in 2026; hall extended to 2,000 sqm and opened in June 2026 with an assembly room; AESA production-organisation approval in February 2025, one of 27 in Spain; staff from 36 (2023) to 47 (2026).
  • Revenue EUR 2.2m (2023) to 3.0m (2024, +35%); EFE reports EBITDA held despite the pay rise (January 2025).
  • Krisos' own figures: EBITDA from about EUR 470k to more than 800k (2024), pay from 4% below to 20% above the regional average, women in leadership from 18% to 62%, company value up 31%; staff survey October 2024: 77% see improvement.
  • The model has a second and third case: Alumipres (May 2025, 48 people, 87% vote, profitable again in 2025) and Indústries Vilassarenca (mid-2026, about 40 jobs, bought through Alumipres).

Where it cracks

  • Conflict of interest: the main source is Corporate Rebels, who co-founded the fund and handle its investor relations; the NER Group's president is a Krisos partner. The model's provider is grading its own work and the Spanish press repeats the figures without checking accounts.
  • 2025 revenue fell about 7% (A400M design changes) - the trajectory is not linear, and the fund's 2021 plan of 3, then 9, then 27 companies has produced two direct deals in five years.
  • Scale and duration: 36-50 people, EUR 3m revenue, three years. Alumipres has one year, Vilassarenca months. No pattern yet.
  • The vehicle is opaque: fund size and investors are not disclosed, abandoned deals are not reported, and the transition to the foundation-owned structure is announced but not shown to be complete.
  • Staff voices in Krisos' own survey: decisions "not always clear or transparent", conflict skills missing, stress from responsibility, and the question "what if Krisos leaves".
  • NER itself reports 19 of 31 transformations abandoned (owner break, cooperative switch, union) - by its own count the model fails more often than it sticks.

Verdict

Krisos/Indaero is the most interesting small case in the list because it tests something the big cases do not: can a change of ownership plus a staff vote plus a known pattern produce a self-organised firm in a company nobody has heard of, without a charismatic founder? Three years in, the externally checkable facts say yes. The performance claims say more than the evidence can carry. Use it as a live experiment with a date, and always name who is reporting.

For a talk

Krisos shows that a fund can buy a company, let the staff vote, remove the bosses and keep it profitable - and it shows why a movement should not be the only auditor of its own portfolio.

Sources

  1. El Conciso: Krisos compra el 25% restante de Indaero (figures 2023-26) (2026-05-30)
  2. Actualidad Aeroespacial: Indaero inauguró sus nuevas instalaciones (2026-06-05)
  3. EFE (via Infobae): Indaero, primera empresa sin jefes en Andalucía (2025-01-29)
  4. La Vanguardia: Alumipres compra Indústries Vilassarenca (2026-05-28)
  5. Corporate Rebels: No managers, no problem - 12 months at Indaero (2024-10)
  6. Corporate Rebels: Krisos fund update (Krisos 2.0) (2024-11)
  7. Corporate Rebels: Krisos - a new kind of investment (80% rule, Alumipres) (2025-09)
  8. Corporate Rebels: NER Group (2019)
  9. Krisos: Portfolio (2026)
  10. RTVE: Trabajar sin jefes ya no es utopía (2025-12-07)

Website: krisos.eu

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